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Strategic Depth, Counterinsurgency & the Logic of Sectarianization: Perspectives on the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s Security Doctrine and Its Regional Implications1 
By Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi1 
‘Take heed, our capacities and capabilities are not merely those things we possess domestically, we also have 
important capacities outside the country; we have supporters, we have strategic depth…in some cases 
because of Islam, in others because of language, and still others because of the Shiʿi religion. These are the 
country’s strategic depth (ʿomq-e rahbordi); these are part of our capabilities; we must use all of our 
capabilities.’ 2 - Ayatollah Khamenei 
‘The Shiʿi Crescent is in the process of formation.’3 – Major General Mohammad Ali Jaʿfari 
‘His Eminence says that Syria is our strategic depth.’ 4 – Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani (d. 2015) 
‘We don’t have a Shiʿi Crescent.’5 – President Hassan Rouhani 
Introduction 
Following the conclusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s preliminary agreement over its nuclear 
programme with the world powers comprising the P5+1, The New York Times published an op-ed by three 
fellows based at the Washington Institute for New East Policy, Soner Cagaptay, James F. Jeffrey and Mehdi 
Khalaji, entitled ‘Iran Won’t Give Up on Its Revolution’. The article argued with gusto that ‘Iran is a 
revolutionary power with hegemonic aspirations. In other words, it is a country seeking to assert its 
dominance in the region and it will not play by the rules.’6 We are told that like Nazi Germany before it, 
Iran is a ‘hegemonic power’, which as if by some ontological necessity is compelled to dominate 
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neighbouring states and reduce them to pliant, cowed vassals. Such ‘hegemonic aspirations’ were not even 
regime-specific, but rather profoundly deep-seated, if not primordial, and spanning at least half a 
millennium, finding their provenance in the Safavid dynasty, which conquered and ultimately unified Iran 
as we know it today in the 16th and 17th centuries. The drive to dominate, moreover, had a distinctly, not to 
mention enduring, sectarian flavour. Even Nixon’s ‘Gendarme of the Persian Gulf’ was not spared. 
Accordingly, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ‘extended financial and military support to Shiite communities 
and its proxies around the Middle East’ and was secure in power as the Syrian Alawites entered into ‘Iran’s 
permanent fold’. Perhaps sensing the heady nature of their claims the authors do eventually acknowledge 
some of the inconvenient facts, which undermine the credibility of an exclusively sectarian explanation for 
Iranian state behaviour. These include the Islamic Republic’s alliance with ‘belligerent Sunni actors’ and 
Christian Armenia against Shiʿite majority Azerbaijan. That which is immutable and unchanging is the 
‘imperial ambition that drives Iranian foreign policy’, supplemented ‘by a religious or millennial worldview 
that rejects the principles of the classic international order.’  
 
The following chapter will attempt to provide a very different explanation of Iranian foreign policy and the 
logic of sectarianization, with an assessment of Iranian counterinsurgency policy and the various constraints 
it has faced in Syria and Iraq following the Arab Uprisings of 2011. It will argue that rather than uniquely 
aggressive and sectarian, the Islamic Republic should be understood as a ‘regional middle power’ whose 
foreign policy has been primarily determined by the systemic insecurity of a regional system penetrated by 
hegemonic great powers.7 The historical development of post-revolutionary Iran’s security policies, which 
are intimately intertwined with its espousal of asymmetric ‘strategies of opposition’, has often taken the 
form of financial and military support for politically responsive co-sectarians. These processes have 
dovetailed with crises of security, trust and legitimacy in weak states, ultimately galvanizing the logic of 
sectarianization in local and region-wide conflicts. To frame this in terms of Tehran’s unyielding drive for 
the incorporation of Arab capitals into a Shiʿi-Persian Empire for the 21st century will be shown to be a 
gross oversimplification. By contrast, this chapter will try to show through an examination of the manifold 
interactions between system-level and meso-level dynamics of securitization, with particular attention to 
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the examples of Iraq and Syria, that the Islamic Republic’s engagement in these conflicts varies widely and 
depends on a host of variables, many of which lie beyond its immediate control.  
 
The Islamic Republic as a Regional Middle Power in a Penetrated System 
 
Following Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, this chapter will contend that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran should be viewed as a ‘regional middle power’. Namely, a state that is decisive to the 
regional balance of power and harbours a credible deterrent capability, which through the deployment of 
both hard and soft power, is able to resist coalitions of adversarial regional states against it. While regional 
middle powers are middle powers on a global scale, they are key actors within the regional system of which 
they comprise a part.8 Such powers assert regional leadership in the name of more general interests, but are 
nevertheless economically and technologically constrained by the core which has traditionally sought to 
prevent any single power from organizing the regional system. Moreover, following Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever, the following analysis acknowledges that the regional security complex (RSC), far from being 
negligible, is of decisive importance.9 Meaning, the security of regional states is sufficiently close that their 
securities cannot be considered separable from one another.10  
 
The Middle East’s security complex’s geo-strategic location,11 vast oil wealth, as well as the presence of the 
Israeli state, have ensured that throughout the course of the second half of the 20th century it has been 
subject to constant penetration by the great powers.12 Adam Hanieh has made a compelling case regarding 
the entwined and mutually reinforcing processes of energy flows to the core and the internationalization of 
capital underwriting the American presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1970s. The ‘[p]etrodollar flows 
from the Gulf, particularly from Saudi Arabia, played a critical role in strengthening both the financialization 
of the system as a whole and the specific role of the United States as the dominant power’.13 The region’s 
fully-fledged incorporation into the world economy, and the sometimes tacit, but often explicit quid pro quo 
agreed between amenable elites and the United States’ government, has historically entailed security 
guarantees, foreign aid, technology and knowledge transfers in exchange for ensuring the steady, secure 
flow of energy to Western markets. Nor is it a surprise that these dynamics have proven decisive in shaping 
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the character of regional alignments, military campaigns, and security agreements in preceding decades e.g. 
Gulf War of 1990-1991, and the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 etc. Such a perspective 
undercuts the claims to unmitigated sovereignty assumed by unalloyed realist theory, and should therefore 
be included in the account of the structural determinants of interstate competition.14  
 
Middle regional powers, cannot completely insulate themselves from the military penetration of global 
powers, or from entanglement in a complex web of capitalist relations, which following WWII progressively 
forged a complementary series of economic and security interests binding together regional and great power 
elites. Under such circumstances middle regional states such as the Islamic Republic can merely attempt to 
minimize their vulnerability by diversifying their economic relations, and if possible, leveraging multi-
polarity and great power rivalry to augment their bargaining power.15 Another possibility is the pursuit of 
‘internal balancing’, and what Stephen M. Walt calls ‘strategies of opposition’, which I will discuss in further 
detail below.  
 
While the first Gulf War has been widely interpreted as inaugurating the establishment of Pax Americana 
and the ‘unipolar moment’ circumscribing Tehran’s ability to capitalise on the great power competition 
which had characterised the Cold War, such triumphalism proved short-lived as the invasion of Iraq 
highlighted the profound limits of American power, as well as the complacency of U.S. elites in their 
capacity to successfully undertake state building dating back to the post-WWII Marshal Plan. More recently 
this trend has been compounded with the global economic crisis of 2008, attesting to the long-term decline 
of the U.S. economy which had begun as early as the late 1960s as a result of over-accumulation, coinciding 
initially with the Vietnam War,16 and intensified economic competition from Germany, Japan, and later 
Deng Xiaoping’s China.17  
 
Bureaucratic-Institutional Rivalries and Consensus Building in Iran’s National Security Policy 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a blow-by-blow account of the various phases of Iranian 
foreign policy over the last thirty years.18 At least since 1989, and the death of the revolutionary patriarch, 
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Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic has instituted a host of mechanisms for consensus 
building on issues pertaining to foreign and national security policy. Where in the course of Khomeini’s 
own lifetime the personalisation of policy-making might have been more prominent e.g. the acceptance of 
UNSC 598 which ended the Iran-Iraq War, the pressures of the regional and international system and 
exigencies of state-building during the eight-year war with Iraq, impelled the bureaucratization, 
rationalization and coordination of national security policy across the breadth of responsible state 
institutions.  
 
As is well established, the Supreme Leader, President and Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council (Shura-ye ʿali-ye amniyat-i melli), Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Defence and Interior, 
relevant Majles Commissions, regular army, Revolutionary Guards, all participate in these intra-elite 
discussions. There is a division of labour, with each institution possessing its own nomenclature, priorities, 
metrics and capital. So, for example, the Foreign Ministry will generally employ the language of international 
‘diplomacy’, while Revolutionary Guard commanders will often speak in terms of military solutions and 
‘security’ and so on. In Bourdieuian terms, one might say that there are overlapping political, religious, 
military etc., fields and that contestation and the accumulation and exchange of political, economic, 
religious, and symbolic capital crisscrosses these numerous fields.19 There is plenty of movement between 
these numerous bodies, as former members of the IRGC are elected to the Majles or executive 
responsibilities change hands between various shades of the political spectrum. Moreover, while factional 
loyalties and interpersonal relationships remain relevant, they play a quite different role than is often the 
case in the domestic context.  
 
Competition between state institutions over resources and favoured means, can also colour discussions as 
distinct institutions routinely declaim their fidelity to the ‘national interest’, which they envision in 
complementary, as well as conflictual ways. One of the better sources in our possession for understanding 
some of the mechanisms involved in consensus-building among the state elite is Hassan Rouhani’s National 
Security and Nuclear Diplomacy, the incumbent president since 2013 and former secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council, as well a former parliamentarian and longstanding member of the Islamic 
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Republic’s defence establishment.20 In a number of instances, he addresses the nature of disagreement, 
consensus building and the less often acknowledged potential for miscalculation. For instance, he mentions 
how Iranian military officials were taken aback by the routing of the Iraqi army in a mere three weeks, 
having believed it would take at least 6 months to a year for the U.S. army to reach Saddam’s palace.21  
 
At present, the chief venue for intra-elite discussions on matters of domestic and international security is 
the Supreme National Security Council on which the heads of all three branches of state sit, along with the 
Guardian Jurist’s representative and highest-ranking military personnel. The SNSC was formed in 1989 
with the revision of the Islamic Republic’s constitution following Khomeini’s death and its responsibilities 
were codified in article 176 of the constitution, where it was stipulated that the council must take up the 
role in ‘[d]etermining the defence and national security policies within the framework of general policies 
determined by the Leader’. The reason for its establishment was to streamline elite level decision-making 
pertaining to national security at both home and abroad, and hasten the process whereby policy could be 
decided and executed.22 All relevant state institutions send their intelligence directly to the SNSC’s 
secretariat allowing for comprehensive evaluation by one or more of its several sub-committees. One of 
the examples Rouhani recounts is the coordinated nature of the Islamic Republic’s public response to 9/11 
and the issue of an official statement condemning the attacks as an act of terrorism. In this instance, the 
Guardian Jurist, Ayatollah ʿAli Khamenei, President Mohammad Khatami, the Director General of Islamic 
Republic of Iran Broadcasting, ʿAli Larijani, and Rouhani, then secretary of the SNSC, conferred and 
quickly made the appropriate decision.23  Another example is given by ʿAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
where he contends that the U.S., U.K. and France, made known their plans to create a ‘safe zone’ for the 
predominantly Shiʿi population of southern Iraq in August 1992 after having expelled the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait. The Foreign Minister of the time, ʿAli Akbar Velayati, conveyed the U.S.’s message stating that 
their interests did not clash with those of Iran. After conferring at the highest levels it was decided that the 
Iranian authorities would not object to the American presence, which of course ultimately never came to 
pass.24 
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Rouhani’s reflections on the decision-making process also evince sensitivity to public opinion and 
perceptions and the need to retain trust, both at the level of elites and the populace.25  This account of elite 
consensus-building mechanisms is also supported by other ones such as that of Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Javad Zarif who in his recently published memoir Mr Ambassador, describes open channels for 
frank discussion between the regime’s manifold personalities and institutions.26 This, however, does not 
mean that individuals such as the president cannot influence or initiate a change in style, tone, and 
occasionally substance, as the case of Ahmadinejad on the nuclear file vividly illustrates,27 and needless to 
say the political and constitutional authority of the Guardian Jurist is decisive on key political decisions and 
the overall direction of policy. In addition to this personal component, there is also the need to acknowledge 
competing articulations of ‘security’, and its status as a contested concept,28 both in Iran and elsewhere, and 
this is perhaps where factional and institutional rivalries become most acute.  
 
Though by no means strictly defined along institutional lines, it is unsurprising that the military and 
diplomatic corps, as well as disparate political factions compete over which view of national security ought 
to be privileged in the formulation and execution of diplomacy and national security policy.29 For example, 
in numerous instances it has been indicated that Ayatollah Khamenei had specifically insisted, in keeping 
with his broad strategic oversight, on Tehran’s support for Bashar al-Assad remaining in power in the face 
of Western demands that he immediately step aside.30 Meanwhile some in the Iranian diplomatic corps had 
considered proposals Assad step down in favour of a regime insider less visibly associated with the bloody 
repression of the preceding years, and above all the deployment of chemical weapons. In keeping with their 
Weltanschauungen, skill set, capital and the division of labour within the regime apparatus, these institutions 
qua institutions, manage distinct, albeit intimately connected aspects of various conflicts. In this way the 
Foreign Ministry can propose diplomatic initiatives calling for a political resolution to an on-going conflict, 
while Revolutionary Guards’ commanders simultaneously proceed to supervise and train militias in 
hotspots across Iraq and Syria. And while the President or Foreign Minister might forcefully denounce 
sectarianism, IRGC commanders managing co-sectarian assets on the ground may express geopolitical 
rivalry in thinly veiled sectarian rhetoric, by for example overtly attacking Wahhabism in the context of 
ongoing conflicts in Iraq or Syria, and indirect conflict with the Saudi kingdom and its allies.  
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Another rhetorical device employed in recent years across almost all state institutions is the virtual 
conflation of all groups at war with allies in either Syria or Iraq as ‘terrorists’. In this way the Iranian 
politicians and military personnel can eschew the severe repercussions of invoking openly sectarian 
language, and instead espouse the post-9/11 lingua franca of the ‘War on Terror’, which both Western and 
non-Western great powers are less inclined to dismiss out of hand. These modus operandi comprise the twin 
elements of a fundamentally political strategy marrying persuasion and brute force, soft and hard power, 
domination and hegemony. In this way the Islamic Republic can avail itself and adduce the norms and laws 
regulating international relations, while partaking in internal balancing and irregular warfare, which will be 
discussed in some detail below.  
 
Strategies of Opposition and Strategic Depth    
 
U.S. imperial overstretch and subsequent administration caution,31 have contributed to a situation whereby 
middle regional powers can take advantage of opportunities to exercise varying degrees of autonomy and 
increase their power within the bounds of the regional system without fear of swift, disproportionate 
reprisal. The Islamic Republic has proven willing to exploit the diminished state capacity of regional 
countries wracked by civil conflicts, to protect and, in certain instances, deepen what high-ranking Iranian 
officials, including the Guardian Jurist himself, have referred to as Iran’s ‘strategic depth’ (ʿomq-e rahbordi).32 
This of course allows the Islamic Republic to keep instability and encroaching threats, emanating from its 
antagonists at a safe distance, while ensuring relative quite prevails at home.33 On the regional scale, strategic 
depth can also be thought of in terms of the logic of ‘offensive realism’,34 ‘look[ing] for opportunities to 
alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals’.35 
While in defensive fashion, leveraging the cost of U.S. regional penetration, which has been perceived by 
powerful individuals and institutions as a major threat to regime survival since the 1979 revolution.  
 
Though the Islamic Republic has sought to expand trade, cultural and religious ties in both Syria and Iraq,36 
it is its support for a cornucopia of paramilitary organizations that has proven to be the Iranian state’s most 
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potent tool for power projection. As opposed to soft or economic power, its relationships with militias 
form the centrepiece of its manifold ‘strategies of opposition’ vis-à-vis regional and external adversaries. 
Such forms of ‘internal balancing’ are observed where weaker states mobilize their internal resources in 
terms of an asymmetric strategy, shifting their competition with more powerful states to those arenas where 
the imbalance of power is less starkly felt.37 Balancing of this sort is complemented by a range of strategies 
such as balking, namely deliberate non-cooperation; binding, which entails the entanglement of self-avowed 
liberal states in the framework of international law and rules; blackmail, whereby dividends are extorted by 
threats or pressure, and delegitimation, where the legitimacy of rival regimes is persistently undermined in the 
international arena.38  
 
The manner in which the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine has developed in view of the threat posed by 
great power penetration is further reflected in the country’s official defence budget which stands at 
approximately $12-14 billion (2014), including support for foreign non-state actors.39 The Islamic 
Republic’s conventional military forces continue to heavily rely upon arms procured under the Shah, while 
as previously mentioned the U.S. arms embargo has ensured that in the wake of the revolution that the 
Iranian state has been severely hampered in the ability to modernize its military or acquire new state of the 
art military technology. This stands in stark contrast to a number of Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours. According 
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the military spending of the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia in 2014 stood at around $22.7 billion and $80.7 billion respectively.40 There are good 
reasons why the sale of billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware to Iran’s chief regional competitors, 
in tandem with the Clinton era policy of ‘containment’, have reinforced the Islamic Republic’s calculus vis-
à-vis the indispensability of support for non-state political-paramilitary actors to its security. Rather than 
directly engaging in conventional conflicts, since the Iran-Iraq War the Revolutionary Guards has honed its 
conduct of asymmetrical and irregular warfare. It would be fair to say that the Iranian state might 
characterise its utilization of such means in the mould of Clausewitz’s famous dictum, ‘war is not merely 
an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political discourse carried on with other 
means’.41 Fighting protracted wars of attrition on multiple fronts to both deter and accumulate political 
influence and leverage.  
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Iran’s asymmetric strategies in the post-Khomeini era are best understood as emerging from its security 
dilemma as opposed to territorial ambitions or the intractable need to perpetually export the Islamic 
Revolution. That being said it is undeniable that the Guardian Jurist and Commanders of the Revolutionary 
Guards regularly make a distinction between the ‘state’ (dowlat, hokumat) and ‘regime’ (nezam). The former 
being geographically and temporally bound and conforming to the boundaries of the Iranian nation-state, 
while the nezam is held to be irreducible to the state, and embody a commitment to ideological and socio-
political revolution which is total and uncompromising in scope.42 As should be clear thus far, I hold the 
latter, in any meaningful sense, to have largely dissipated with the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, even while it remains an important means of framing mobilizations at both home 
and abroad,43 and on occasion deployed to undermine the legitimacy of the incumbent executive on the 
domestic front.  
 
Furthermore, a disproportionate emphasis on this ideological aspect of Iranian state discourse, actually 
obscures explanation of the Iranian state’s actual behaviour, given its genuine structural constraints, and 
fuels value-laden and sensationalist characterizations of the latter. The Islamic Republic’s profound lack of 
technological edge, and the dated nature of its military hardware due to international isolation and the U.S. 
arms embargo, make any notion of the Islamic Republic’s actual control of manifold Arab states and their 
incorporation into some Persian imperial order an entirely untenable proposition. Certain politicians and 
military personnel’s inflammatory comments, most notably those of ʿAli-Reza Zakani, a prominent 
conservative parliamentarian, who bombastically declared Iran’s control of four Arab capitals,44 are best 
interpreted in terms of the dilemma faced by weaker regional powers trying to deter stronger ones by 
exaggerating their capabilities and misrepresenting their own strength.45 It also performs the role of inflating 
Iran’s role in regional conflicts, where its reach and influence is highly qualified. This is most apparent in 
the case of Yemen, where certain Iranian politicians cheer every Huthi victory, thereby enraging regional 
adversaries and embroiling Saudi armed forces evermore deeply in the conflict to the point where 
‘meaningful victory’ becomes hard to discern. This is not to deny that certain personages in the Iranian 
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state might aspire to such a role, but systemic pressures, hard and soft power constraints and elite cleavages, 
fundamentally preclude its feasibility.   
 
The sectarianization of regional conflicts has been at least in part a secondary process and outcome of Iran 
and other regional players partaking in balancing strategies through support for receptive co-sectarians, 
despite the fact that sectarian identity has by no means exclusively determined political alliances of this kind. 
This process is merely one of several processes by which civil conflicts in the Middle East have becomes 
subject to the dynamics of sectarianization. Transnational solidarities and support revolving around the 
regional power balance have proven decisive to the construction of alliances between sub-state and foreign 
state actors, while the increased salience of sectarianism, both discursively and in terms of the character of 
civil violence, can make such alliances across confessional lines increasingly costly to the sub-state 
organization, partially dependent on foreign patronage; Hamas’ effort to distance itself from Tehran in the 
aftermath of the Syrian uprising and the Assad regime’s violent repression of it illustrating the point well.46 
The Islamic Republic’s policy of politicizing ascriptive group identities has its lineage in the Islamist 
movement preceding the revolution, and Tehran’s subsequent politico-ideological relationships with co-
sectarian political organizations such as Hizbullah and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), dating back to the revolution’s first decade.47 To ascribe such resilience exclusively to the sectarian 
factor would be quite misleading, given that there is a complex web of political and economic interests, 
which determine the nature and preponderance of these relationships. In a similar vein, it is not sufficient 
to explain why such relationships have been able to endure and in certain instances flourish.  
 
Mass Mobilizations and Emerging Anarchy   
 
Instead of renovating its conventional capabilities for which it had only limited means as a result of the U.S. 
arms embargo, the Islamic Republic sought to harness, channel and discursively frame the socio-political 
and armed mobilizations of politically receptive elements in weak states, affording it asymmetrical 
capabilities and strategic depth against both regional adversaries and perceived superpower threats. Weak 
states, broadly speaking, are those which for manifold reasons come to lack significant autonomy i.e. the 
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ability to perform basic tasks independently of social groups, and capacity, i.e. the ability of the state to 
execute its programmes and decisions,48 and subsequently emerged as staging grounds for interstate and 
great power competition. It naturally follows that these two shortcomings fundamentally impair the state’s 
ability to exercise a monopoly or even the semblance of a monopoly on violence and coercion. Political 
receptivity and the pool from which such socio-political movements can effectively recruit, under 
conditions of state weakness are in turn related to people’s perceptions of security and insecurity, or what 
Barry R. Posen calls ‘emerging anarchy’.49 The Islamic Republic’s own Revolutionary Guards and Basij 
Forces, whose very name means ‘mobilization’, were born at the juncture of a major social revolution and 
interstate war, just as Lebanon’s Hizbullah emerged from the battleground of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-
1990) and Israeli occupation of Beirut in 1982. It was in the course of this process that the Islamic Republic 
was able to forge a model of political, social and armed mobilization that proved incredibly durable, and 
which it has turned to, time and again, over the course of some three decades.  
 
Most recently these knowhow and resources have been deployed in the internecine conflicts of post-2003 
Iraq and the post-2011 Syrian Civil War. In both cases to support regional allies experiencing challenges to 
their legitimacy from armed political opponents. The nature of Iranian engagement, however, is intimately 
bound up with several interrelated factors. The most important of which are undoubtedly state weakness 
and highly dysfunctional state institutions from which the numerous other corollaries arguably follow. 
These include the presence of ascriptive identity groups, either ethnic or sectarian, sceptical of state 
neutrality, poor or largely absent welfare provision,50 a pool of political entrepreneurs and violent specialists 
ready to ally themselves with strong external states to further their immediate political and material goals, a 
political economy riddled by politicized patronage networks and afflicted by deep-seated inequality and 
structural unemployment.  
 
State weakness in the case of Iraq, however, did not simply appear in a vacuum. American imperialism not 
only destroyed the Baʿthist state and the last vestiges of Iraqi associational life, but also played a decisive 
role in the new state’s reconstitution, and the effective institutionalization of the ethno-sectarian 
constitutional order. While it would be disingenuous to claim sectarianism in Iraq began with the American 
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invasion and occupation, there are strong grounds to contend that the new politico-constitutional regime, 
often euphemistically referred to as ‘consociational democracy’, generated unprecedented modes and ways 
of sectarian identification and competition, which were novel in Iraq’s history, and incentivized political 
actors’ recourse to sectarian-laden discourses and forms of mobilization. Thus as Anne Alexander has 
commented, ‘sectarian “balance”—and therefore its corollary, sectarian competition—was enshrined in 
America’s Iraq from the start. The practice of muhasasa, or the use of a sectarian quota system for 
appointments, was implemented by political parties whose survival was bound up with entrenching 
sectarianism.’51   
 
The process whereby we see the sectarianization of civil and interstate conflicts is the outcome of highly 
contentious civil and militarised mobilizations and counter-mobilisations stemming from a combination of 
domestic and interstate security dilemmas. Thus at the domestic level, where the central state is perceived 
as lacking both autonomy and capacity and unable to deliver security to the population, and especially when 
it is perceived to be confessional in its provision of security and welfare service provision,52 the likelihood 
of the emergence of a security dilemma along confessional lines is increased, as is the prominence of those 
elements which decide to take up the role of providing security and presenting themselves as defenders of 
the ascriptive identity group in question.53 Such a framework seeks to provide an account of the driving 
forces behind the efficacy of the Islamic Republic’s balancing strategies as deployed in its patronage and 
alliances with various actors in Iraq and Syria and its efforts to preserve strategic depth through recourse 
to armed political organizations. In this way following Rogers Brubaker we can dispense with groupist 
assumptions, and instead regard sectarian identity as a variable, rather a constant.54  Sinisa Malesevic’s 
conceptualization of ethnicity is also relevant to the framing of the Islamic Republic’s relationships with 
political organizations bearing ascriptive confessional identities. He frames such identities as politicized 
social action, where ‘cultural differences are politicized in the context of intensive group interaction’.55  
 
‘Militias’, which have been a key vehicle for the preponderance of Iranian state influence, and as this chapter 
will attempt to show, in like fashion can be thought of as armed and politicized social action, or in the 
words of Charles Tilly, a form of contentious politics.56 But a genuine problem associated with the use of 
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the term ‘militia’ is that it often obscures the social-embeddness of certain armed sub-state organizations 
and the fact that they are ultimately political organizations pursuing political aims. It is, however, necessary 
to concede that not all, or even the majority, of the organizations patronized by the Islamic Republic in 
Iraq and Syria emanated from broad-based social movements. In fact, it often seems to be quite the opposite 
insofar as a number of political actors with close-knit relations to Tehran were first founded as politico-
military organizations only to begin the process of establishing social, cultural and welfare networks later 
down the line. This is observable in the case of Syria, but certain militias in Iraq such as Kataʾib Hizbullah 
and Saraya al-Khorasani present a similar problem. That being said those organizations in which Iranian 
state operatives had a direct hand in establishing are only a number of a multitude of groups currently 
embroiled in these conflicts.  
 
However, without getting preoccupied with this issue, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
essential to acknowledge following Melanie Cammett that, ‘where public welfare functions are 
underdeveloped and religious or ethnic organizations provide social protection, the provision of social 
services both constitute and reproduces the politics of sectarianism’.57 Social and welfare protection is thus 
an important counterpart to the physical security militias often claim to provide. One recent notable 
example is that of ʿAsaʿib ahl al-Haqq, which seceded from the Sadrist movement in 2006 and was initially 
best known for its January 2007 raid against U.S. Army headquarters in Karbala killing one soldier and 
kidnapping four more. Since this time and as its relationships with former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki, the latter’s allies, the so-called Malikyun, and the Islamic Republic have developed, so has its media, 
educational and socio-cultural outreach.58 Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the case of both Iraq and 
Syria militarized political groups, which have received arms and training from the Islamic Republic, despite 
intermittent recourse to sectarian language and symbols, have often embedded their claims in more 
comprehensive ones in the name of a contested vision of the nation and issues of social justice.59 In doing 
so they are able to advance sectional interests and mobilize subaltern and proletarianized classes in the 
agonistic struggle for political power and resources.  
 
Balance of Power and the Origins of the ‘Axis of Resistance’  
Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, ed. Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, 




An important factor determining Iran’s security doctrine in the cases of Iraq and Syria has been said to 
reside in a combination of defensive and offensive realism, depending on whether one is focussing on the 
international or regional scale. According to John Mearsheimer, offensive realism holds that states strive to 
become the hegemon of the anarchic system of which they form a part,60 and this ultimately stems from 
the drive to increase their chances of survival. Defensive realism, as initially theorised by Kenneth Waltz, 
instead focused on how state behaviour under conditions of anarchy is primarily occupied with deterring 
threats and balancing against such threats to their security. Defensive realism contended states achieved 
this by behaving defensively and maintaining the extant balance of power, rather than seeking to overturn 
it.61 Thus, while defensive realism argues states tend to reinforce the status quo, offensive realism holds 
that anarchy leads states to ‘seek more power to maximize the odds of survival’, making for more 
‘aggressive’ and robust security competition.62 However, the combination of these two models, namely a 
defensive realism taken up with respect to extra-regional hegemonic powers e.g. the United States, and 
offensive realism vis-à-vis fellow regional powers, will not suffice as an explanation, since it merely affords 
insight into the broader structural factors and dynamics, determining Iranian state behaviour. Moreover, it 
should be acknowledged that offensive realism was originally developed by Mearsheimer for analysing the 
behaviour of ‘great powers’ on a global scale. In this instance, we are speaking about a complex of regional 
states in which security in highly interdependent,63 namely a regional security complex, and yet 
overdetermined by great power penetration, which has an obvious impact on the calculus of powerful states 
in the RSC such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. One way of integrating great power rivalry into the 
regional security complex is through inclusion of the U.S. into the RSC as does F. Gregory Gause III in his 
delineation of the Persian Gulf Regional Security Complex. But since the Levant is peripheral to this 
approach and the profoundly interdependent and strategic character of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ 
i.e. Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, understated, it seems more accurate to retain a broader view of regional security, 
which simultaneously acknowledges great power competition still has a formidable role to play. Russia’s 
aerial bombing campaign in Syria at the outset of October 2015 is a stark reminder of just this fact. Another 
possible way to frame this problem is if we decide to regard the Persian Gulf RSC as one of multiple sub-
complexes within the wider Middle East.64 Nevertheless, the simple application of the defensive and 
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offensive realist paradigms to the case of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine prove not unproblematic 
for various reasons, since they tend to neglect the historical genealogy and evolution of this doctrine, along 
with its specific characteristics and modus operandi. The following pages will attempt to qualify and complicate 
further the application of such inductive models to the Iranian case.  
 
Iran’s relationship with Syria dates to the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 and was initially concerned with 
balancing against the rival Baʿthist regime in Iraq and its efforts to cast itself in the role of aspiring regional 
hegemon following the collapse of the Shah’s ancien régime.65 What this argument, also proffered by 
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch,66 could not envisage at the time is how the alliance has proven so enduring 
despite the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the subsequent emergence of a friendly regime in Baghdad, 
provoking a seismic shift in the regional power distribution. The overthrow of the Baʿthist regime in Iraq 
induced a shift in the regional power distribution from multi-polarity to bi-polarity, where Iran and Saudi 
Arabia remain the only two formidable powers in the Persian Gulf,67 provoking a watershed transformation 
in the dynamics of securitization. The Tehran-Damascus alliance has generally been seen to rest upon 
geostrategic considerations such as opposition to U.S. and Israeli domination of the region and the pivotal 
role played by Hizbullah in bulwarking both countries influence in Lebanon. But as the Syrian uprising 
escalated into full-blown civil war, besides the aforesaid geostrategic considerations, the issue of 
omnibalancing had become especially acute, whereby the regime had to assess whether the greatest threat 
emanated from foreign or domestic sources.68 The existential threat to the Assad regime itself in light of 
the challenge posed by the armed opposition has galvanized the Tehran-Damascus alliance and compelled 
the Assad regime to accept a host of encroachments,69 many of which it would not have previously 
countenanced. By contrast, Iran’s present-day alliance with Baghdad originates in the U.S. invasion and 
occupation of Iraq and the effective liquidation of many of the erstwhile institutions of the former regime. 
The neoconservative architects of that war had convinced themselves it would result in a democratic, pro-
Western polity that would stand as an exemplar to the region, and tilt the regional balance against Tehran 
and Damascus. As we know today, the exact opposite occurred and it was the burgeoning alliance with 
several powerful Iraqi political forces within the newly-minted political elite which led Jordan’s King 
Abdullah II to resort to the highly problematic epithet of ‘Shiʿi Crescent’.  
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It is worthwhile recalling that in the immediate months following the invasion of Iraq, Sadeq Kharazi, Iran’s 
former ambassador to France and a relative-by-marriage of the Guardian Jurist, sent a proposal to the U.S. 
via the Swiss embassy. It pledged that there would be ‘no Iranian endeavours to develop or possess WMD’ 
and ‘full cooperation with IAEA’, but also to demobilize Lebanese Hizbullah, transforming it into a strictly 
political party.70 Whether such an offer would have ever come to fruition had the Bush administration 
chosen to indulge its Iranian counterparts at this critical juncture is subject to debate, but what subsequently 
happened during the catastrophic viceroyship of L. Paul Bremer III, and the now infamous policy of de-
Baʿthification undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority, guaranteed it remained a counterfactual 
left to the judgement of posterity. The fierce insurgency against the occupation cutting across sectarian 
lines, provided the conditions under which the Islamic Republic and Syrian regime could employ a slew of 
strategies of opposition to increase the cost of the American occupation, and thus help engender the 
circumstances of its eventual withdrawal. Syria’s intentional neglect of its shared border facilitated Sunni 
jihadists travel to Iraq to fight U.S. occupying forces,71 while the Islamic Republic supported and trained 
receptive groups, with a shared stake in vanquishing the Americans, and long cultivated clients such as the 
Badr Organisation, who progressively took over elements of the state apparatus itself.72 These strategies 
can be interpreted as classic cases of ‘internal balancing’ undertaken by asymmetric powers. In the years 
which followed the Islamic Republic cultivated its relationships with numerous Shiʿi factions, and in several 
cases, set itself up as patron and arbiter, as was seen in the intra-Shiʿite conflicts in Karbala in 200773 and 
Basra in March 2008.74  
 
Political Entrepreneurs, Proxies and Sectarianization  
 
The composition of the myriad pro-government militias in Syria and Iraq, but foremost the latter, in view 
of their confessional makeup have often been taken as evidence of the incontrovertibly sectarian character 
of the current civil conflicts cum proxy war overrunning these countries. Some analysts depict the 
relationships in simple dyadic terms,75 a vertical patron-client relationship, in which the client 
straightforwardly obeys the patron’s demands. A more sophisticated approach, however, acknowledges that 
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there is a clear typology of militias. Moreover, a more attentive sociological analysis of the composition, 
geographical location and socio-economic makeup of the militias in question is necessary if we care to 
escape the problems associated with the dyadic model. In short, a typology of the kinds of militias, which 
operate in these arenas is essential, in addition to a qualified understanding of the nature of ‘dependence’ 
and ‘control’, which various forms of patronage might afford. Given the sheer number of militias operating 
in Iraq and Syria it is also necessary to examine the levels at which they operate, since clearly many of them 
do not function on a national, but merely local basis. Our chief concern is those with ties to Iranian armed 
forces and operatives, and the nature of those ties, which in numerous cases qualitatively vary. Armed 
groups can be distinguished in several ways. The nature of armed groups stands on a wide-ranging 
spectrum, with militias in Iraq and Syria either approximating, or amounting to an amalgam of the idealised 
types below, the two extremes ranging from independent social movement to dependent client.  
 
1) An armed group embedded within a broader social movement and series of local networks, which 
possesses an independent political agenda, and enjoys a self-sustaining stream of revenue extracted 
from its social base. 
2) An armed group with access to domestic state funds either through co-opted state institutions 
and/or leveraged by means of intra-elite bargaining, but receiving military training and political 
support from an external power.  
3) An armed client group, funded, organized and trained exclusively by an external patron and serving 
the latter’s goals.  
 
Apart from only addressing the question of a militias’ fiscal base, it is also necessary to consider confessional 
and ideological factors, which will impact the nature of cooperation and how the relationship changes in 
accordance with shifting geopolitical circumstances. This yields a further typology, which would overlay 
that enumerated above.  
 
1) Ideologically committed and co-sectarian.  
2) Ideologically committed, but non-Twelver Shiʿi.  
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3) Instrumental political commitment and co-sectarian.  
4) Instrumental political commitment, but non-Twelver Shiʿi.  
 
To reiterate, these are generalized types, which serve a heuristic purpose in the effort to shed light on the 
nature of the Islamic Republic’s sponsorship and support for armed paramilitary organizations, which as 
should by now be clear, vary widely on several counts, as do the roles they play in the plural dynamics of 
civil conflicts and their ‘sectarianization’.   
 
The initial contention was that the Islamic Republic’s security dilemma at the regional and international 
levels has pushed the Iranian state to pursue strategic depth through support for co-sectarian paramilitary 
organizations such as Lebanon’s Hizbullah and the Badr Organization in Iraq, to name a few. Syria’s 
National Defence Force has its own unique dynamics in terms of its relationship with the Islamic Republic, 
reflecting the nature of its alliance with the Assad regime, which this paper will attempt to clarify in due 
course. Each one of these organizations have traversed specific paths of development, but at bottom and 
especially in their initial stages, were composed of what Tilly has termed ‘political entrepreneurs’ and 
‘violence specialists’. These individuals respond to the security dilemmas experienced by members of 
confessional communities in societies gripped by civil conflict, with highly diminished state autonomy and 
capacity. They agitate and organize to represent their community and present themselves as the defenders 
of their respective communities, and thereby often resort to emotive language, crafting narratives 
connecting people and soliciting their emotional investment in such narratives.76 According to this model, 
interpersonal networks are central to such mobilizations.77 Relationships with foreign states, in this instance, 
the Islamic Republic, can prove mutually beneficial in both material and political terms, and are not 
necessarily the simple outcome of transnational sectarian affinities. One guiding hypothesis, which would 
require a separate study to vindicate empirically, is that the ‘cost’ of acquiring and retaining the political 
loyalty of such political entrepreneurs is diminished in relation to the extent of ideological and sectarian 
overlap between sponsors and sponsored.78 Such costs, however, are multi-faceted, and far from being 
exclusively monetary in nature, and naturally vacillate and depend on levels of insecurity as gauged by 
political entrepreneurs and the populace at large. Moreover, patronage in and of itself does have the capacity 
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to draw an organization, especially one devoid of an independent social constituency, ever closer into the 
ideological orbit of its patron, but this is by no means a forgone conclusion.  
 
The more paramilitary organizations are able to successfully fulfil the capacities of war-making and 
extraction, through the likes of foreign funding, donations, protection rents and bureaucratized taxation,79 
the more they will be able to assume the basic functions of a state,80 and perhaps even domestically 
legitimate their militarized social network vis-à-vis the formally recognized government. This has been the 
case with Hizbullah in Lebanon, while the Population Mobilization Units of Iraq continue to be in a state 
of flux, as various political factions and the Iranian state endeavour to influence the process of its 
institutionalization.81 The more a militarized political organization assuming certain responsibilities of the 
state is able to generate or underwrite the conditions for capital accumulation, so the logic goes, the more 
it should be able to exercise autonomy vis-à-vis its one-time state sponsor. And given that the leaders of 
several Shiʿi militias in Iraq, including those whose detractors claim to be beholden to Tehran, have been 
able to assume national office and thereby attain access to the state largess of what is one of the world’s 
largest oil producing nations, question remarks remain as to how the relationship will evolve, when and if, 
the threat posed by organizations such as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is eventually 
neutralized.82  
 
As previously mentioned, political entrepreneurs partake in forms of brokerage and create connections 
between various sites and groups. More importantly they specialize in representation and advocate on behalf 
of highly politicized identities.83 In this way they are also able to activate us-them boundaries, and contribute 
to the polarization of communities which had been peacefully living side by side for generations, as they 
emphasize merely one dimension, namely the confessional, of individuals’ plural, overlapping identities e.g. 
Iraqi, Shiʾi, Basrawi, masculine, middle class etc. They build networks of supporters upon which they can 
draw, and thereby sustain and augment their own power.84 Violent specialists, very simply, possess expertise 
in the use and deployment of inflicting, organizing and dispensing violence. These are not agents unique to 
the Middle East as anyone who has read Eric Hobsbawm’s classic Bandits,85 or more recent scholarship of 
Janice E. Thompson pertaining to early modern Europe, can testify.86 Both works describe in great detail 
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the variety of actors, including pirates, mercenaries, rebels and private armies, which exercised violence in 
pursuit of their own aims alongside one another and harboured the capacity to both agitate against and 
cooperate with the ascendant power of the day. It is worth noting that the supposedly impervious 
‘monopoly of violence’, which we immediately associate with the modern state only came to exist in 
Western Europe in recent memory, and has never been experienced by a great many countries in the global 
South.  
 
As Tilly makes clear, the roles of political entrepreneurs and violence specialists can overlap considerably. 
In the case of Iraq, former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, ʿAsaʾib’s Qays al-Khazʿali, the Badr 
Organization’s Hadi al-ʿAmeri and the Sadrist movement’s Muqtada al-Sadr, are all fitting examples of 
individuals who have been able to fulfil the roles of political entrepreneur and violence specialist, even if 
they might approximate one of the roles more than the other. But most importantly, it is through these 
actors’ claims to represent either the nation and/or the faithful and the framing processes which accompany 
such claims, and the real and virtual prominence of such advocates in public life, that conflicts of this nature 
are ‘sectarianized’, while their origins in the state weakness and insecurity are elided.  
 
Realpolitik and the Pluralization of Violence: Militias and Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Syria 
 
The Shiʿi paramilitary organizations which have developed in the course of the last several years in Iraq and 
the predominantly, but by no means exclusively Alawite / Christian, National Defence Force in Syria have 
been the subject of much criticism and controversy.87 In certain instances, Iraq in particular, these irregular 
armed groups have also been commended for fighting in the name of the homeland, the watan, particularly 
in the aftermath of Mosul’s fall to ISIL in June 2014, which had been widely depicted as an existential threat 
to the Iraqi polity itself. Indeed, the overwhelmingly Shiʿi Popular Mobilization Units (Hashd al-Shaʿbi) 
which formed in the aftermath of Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa wajib al-kifaʾi, calling on Iraqis to defend 
‘their country and their people and their holy places’, has now received formal legal recognition and in 
principle made accountable to, and funded by, the Prime Minister’s office, in an effort to diminish the 
downward spiral into what one commentator has described as a ‘militia state’.88 In the face of the Iraqi 
Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, ed. Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, 
London & New York: Hurst / Oxford University Press, 2016. Submitted, unedited draft. 
 
22 
army’s rapid disintegration, the opportunity structure was such, that a significant swathe of the Shiʿi 
community mobilized in reaction to the perceived threat to not only their holy places, but their lives on an 
individual and community basis.89 The emergence of ISIL has introduced a new dynamic into regional 
power calculations and the valencies of sectarianism. The signifier takfiri,90 largely used by the Islamic 
Republic and allies such as Hizbullah, eschews outright sectarian denunciation, whereas jihadi-Salafists 
openly espouse the excommunication of Shiʿis as rawafidh, namely, ‘rejectionists’. The negation of the Other 
is integral to their identity in a way it clearly is not in the case of Iranian Islamism and its radical Shiʿi 
counterparts. The Islamic Republic pan-Islamist commitments, post-colonial imbrications, and minority 
status in the broader region, mitigate its overt resort and exploitation of sectarian rhetoric and symbols. 
Nevertheless, there is a discursive process at work which is relational and co-constitutive, and when 
sectarianism is manifest at the discursive level, it is not Other-centred in the same way that we observe in 
the language of ISIL and its cognates. Namely, the negation of Sunni Islam is not integral to its self-image 
and dissemination. Rather it assertively brandishes markers of Shiʿi identity, in ways that have been for the 
most part abjured by pan-Arabists and secularists alike.91  
 
Apart from Sistani’s fatwa and office’s role in encouraging and religiously legitimating the mobilization, 
financing, training and coordination was a joint effort of the Iraqi government, the Shiʿi tribes (though it 
should be noted that many tribes cut across sect), local government, established militias (the most powerful 
of which have strong ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran), as well as other members of the religious 
establishment.92 This was a juncture at which the central government struggled to exercise control and in 
certain respects engendered a scenario whereby foreign states such as Iran could further enmesh its allies 
and clients within the fabric of the putatively national security apparatus. This is already what had effectively 
taken place during the peak of sectarian violence of 2006-2007, when the Badr Organization, which was at 
the time still the armed wing of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, had infiltrated the Interior Ministry and 
its police forces and relied on the veneer of officialdom to partake in retaliatory attacks against sectarian 
and co-sectarian adversaries and even assassinate former Iraqi pilots allegedly responsible for bombing 
Iranian cities in the Iran-Iraq War.93 Nonetheless, it is today difficult to deny that the Hashd as the Minister 
of Interior, Mohammed al-Ghabban, himself a member of the Badr Organization, has contended is ‘an 
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inseparable element of Iraq’s fabric’ with an a differentiated set of social bases and revenue streams.94 Just 
as one cannot ignore the fact that many of the men heading its poly-cephalous paramilitary organizations, 
such as al-ʿAmeri, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Qays al-Khazʾali and Muqtada al-Sadr comprise part of Iraq’s 
political elite and acquire their ability to act as power-brokers by virtue of their social constituencies and/or 
the armed men they command. These factors, namely their own domestic resources and constituencies, 
temper their relationship with the Iranian state, whose support has been viewed as a mixed blessing. While 
there is much gratitude in view of the common threat faced, much suspicion remains vis-à-vis Iranian 
penetration, in view of the prominence of individuals such al-ʿAmeri and al-Muhandis, who were formerly 
based in and solely reliant on Tehran. Domestic pressures to ‘Iraqicise’ have been particularly pronounced 
in the case of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and according to one account, it was the Badr 
Organisation’s ‘Iran-orientation’, which contributed to its break with the ISCI in 2012.95 A further issue is 
that those organized groups, which have possessed longstanding ties to Iranian state elites and military 
institutions tend to be better organised, armed and paid, more experienced and trained, and thus benefit 
from an asymmetrical advantage over their more recent volunteer compatriots.  
 
The dynamic in Syria for several reasons is fundamentally different. The Badr Organization are redoubtable 
Twelver Shiʿi Islamists96 (with a view to our typology, they are largely ideologically aligned, though 
differences remain) comparable to their one-time Iranian patrons, and were organized along similar lines 
to Iran’s own Basij paramilitary forces, cultivating highly integrated political and organizational relationships 
between the two over the course of some three decades. The first decade was preoccupied with fighting 
under the broader tutelage of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards against the Iraqi army, both harbouring the 
shared aim of toppling Saddam Hussein’s Baʿthist regime.97 While more recently, Badr’s commander-in-
chief Hadi al-ʿAmeri was not only pictured on the battle front with the Quds Force’s Major-General 
Qassem Soleimani, driving the campaign to free Amerli from ISIL control, but has repeatedly attested to 
the fraternal and longstanding nature of their relationship, and his approbation of Khamenei’s leadership 
of the Islamic ummah.98  
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The nature of the organization, especially its experienced cadres, and the role of Iranian personnel in 
training thousands of Iraqi volunteers with the coordination of the Baghdad government has obviously 
placed the Islamic Republic’s allies in a favourable position within the umbrella of the Hashd. But this should 
not be thought of as synonymous with control by the external power, because one needs to consider the 
volunteer nature of the initial surge in membership, not to mention the sheer number of political, social 
and religious actors embroiled in the organization’s make up, which see themselves as defending Iraq’s 
national interest, albeit mediated and inflected through a Shiʿi-majoritarian nationalist lens. Moreover, 
training can be understood in terms of fraternal solidarity and political alliance, without implying obedience, 
or even control, since there is a convergence of interests between the political entrepreneurs inside Iraq and 
the Iranian state in consolidating their power in the battle against ISIL.  
 
There are a whole series of interpersonal networks and organizations, which are simply not reducible to the 
simplistic dyad of patron-client. From the Sadrists, to powerful predominantly Shiʿi tribes, and the 
traditional religious establishment and factions within the Iraqi state itself. Moreover, formidable volunteer 
forces have been organized within the ʿatabat, namely the shrine cities, particularly Karbala and Najaf, in 
what is a historical trend dating back to at least the early 19th century. And it is interesting to note at that 
time, notwithstanding crucial differences, according to Meir Litvak, urban gangs developed as ‘a mechanism 
for providing communal and personal security for members of a community in response to the absence of 
permanent governmental authority in the frontier situation, or where the formal government was invested 
with very little legitimacy’.99 In short, these forces have developed and thrived in response to domestic 
security dilemmas, rather than simply fabricated whole-cloth and manipulated by outside powers.  
 
The Syrian National Defence Force (Quwat ad-defaʿ al-watani), by contrast, was only founded in late 2012, 
and was largely a measure born of necessity, as members of the largely conscripted army, began to either 
defect to opposition forces such as the Free Syria Army, or abscond altogether. Reflecting the character of 
the Iran-Syria relationship itself the NDF is the outcome of an exercise in knowledge transfer between two 
authoritarian allies overlaying a domestic security dilemma as individuals and groups invested in the survival 
of the Assad regime, or fearing the outcome of the regime’s collapse, as well as elements looking to exploit 
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the vacuum resulting from state withdrawal, organized themselves with the aid of an external actor, namely 
the Islamic Republic. The NDF has little to no sectarian or ideological affinity with the Islamic Republic, 
and does not possesses a longstanding relationship with the external power which played a role in its initial 
training and organization. In this instance, the Islamic Republic acted as a facilitator helping train, streamline 
and organise the pro-regime Popular Committees,100 which had taken up Bashar al-Assad’s call to take up 
responsibility for security on behalf of the regime and police dissent within their local communities.101 In 
this case we therefore see very little by way of ideological affinity, and instead observe a relationship, which 
is defined partially in fiscal terms, and partly in terms of knowledge transfer and training.  
 
Insofar as ‘sectarianization’ was at all a factor, it might be said to be one of the repercussions of a far more 
profound political antagonism at the domestic level i.e. the ruling Alawite families’ (not Alawites tout court) 
and their tribal allies’ repression of the predominantly, but not exclusively Sunni anti-regime opposition and 
the militarization of this political conflict,102 not an ideational one binding the Syria’s ruling clan to the 
Islamic Republic’s politic elite. As Thomas Pierret has argued, a key element underlying regime resilience 
in Syria are the kinship/sectarian ties which define its elite security apparatus and military forces.103 By 
contrast, few dispute the Revolutionary Guards’ occasionally evident frustration with the NDF, which 
according to numerous accounts is manned, at least in part, with semi-criminal toughs, often disparagingly 
referred to simply as the shabiha,104 who had become notorious in previous decades for illegal smuggling, 
looting, extortion and brazen corruption. Some of these behaviours have carried through to the present, 
often alienating the very same communities within which they were supposed to maintain order.105 But as 
Aron Lund has argued, one needs to be careful not to gloss over the actual diversity and local nature of 
such pro-Assad armed groups fighting in Syria, which have included ‘plain-clothes police, intelligence 
personnel, Baʿath Party members and paramilitary groups, government-linked tribal figures, and young men 
recruited for money by intelligence contacts or pro-regime businessmen’.106 In short, local dynamics are 
absolutely key to understanding the composition of pro-Assad forces and their alliances in disparate regions 
across Syria. 
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Furthermore, in the case of the NDF questions remain to what extent the Assad regime is able to control 
these myriad and highly decentralized paramilitary groups. It is for this reason the Islamic Republic has 
played an integral part in organizing, mobilizing and arming numerous, predominantly foreign militias and 
collaborated with trusted partners such as Lebanese Hizbullah, Badr Organization, and more recently 
established organizations such as the Iraqi Kataʾib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-ʿAbbas and 
Kataʾib Hizbullah to fight Assad’s adversaries. In comparison to the NDF where ideological affinity is 
negligible, the latter groups harbour a significant degree of overlap, even while the financial and other 
material incentives certainly continue to play a role. Thus the nature of Iranian engagement is intimately 
intertwined with the nature and characteristics of the regime in power (in both cases considered an ally), 
the social base and client networks of the latter, and these countries’ own variegated regional demographic 
balances, but also the confessional distribution across state institutions, especially those endowed with the 
capacity for coercion. Moreover, while the Iranian-Syrian alliance neither originated, nor fundamentally 
rests on sectarian considerations, the Islamic Republic has interestingly relied upon a ‘sectarian’ explanation 
for the presence of IRGC personnel in Syria, while repeatedly denying participation in the wider conflict, 
claiming instead, that the latter were in Syria in a purely advisory capacity. The official, ‘sectarian’ 
explanation offered for the presence of alleged retirees and active members of the IRGC in Syria has been 
the defence of the Sayyida Zaynab and Sayyida Ruqqaya shrines in Damascus’ suburbs, under the banner 
of the so-called Defenders of the Sayyida Zaynab Shrine. In this way the Iranian authorities sought to describe 
their role as strictly delimited in geographical terms; the ‘sacred geography’ of the shrines, while disavowing 
the larger and essentially political ambition and role of sending advisors and senior personnel to directly 
partake in the defence of strategic locations along the Syrian-Lebanese border, namely Hizbullah’s logistical 
support channels, or key cities such as Homs and Aleppo, vital to the very feasibility and preponderance of 
the Assad regime.107  
 
While one prominent IRGC commander, Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani, went as far as to claim that 
Iran had established a ‘second Hizbullah’ in Syria,108 the relationship and commander structure is 
fundamentally different, as is the esprit de corps, which has traditionally bound Hizbullah to its Iranian patron. 
It is for this reason that the Islamic Republic has essentially subcontracted a great deal of the fighting to 
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Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani co-sectarians. This is not merely a matter of retaining plausible deniability, but 
also in the bluntest of terms, reducing the costs, both political and economic, of Iranian involvement. The 
Iranian state is not accountable in the same way to its own social base or the wider public when it comes 
to the death of foreign Shiʿi fighters hailing from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan. When senior 
members of the Revolutionary Guards are killed in action their deaths must be accounted for, 
commemorated and sacralised in the public sphere, which had until October 2015 constrained the extent 
of the Islamic Republic’s commitment to placing Iranian ‘boots on the ground’, to use a hackneyed phrase. 
The analogy with Vietnam which has on occasion been cited by some pundits early on was thus not 
unproblematic, since Iran after four years of conflict had proven itself highly reluctant to commit large 
numbers of ground troops, instead preferring to retain its forces’ suppleness and versatility through advising 
and overseeing pro-government Syrian militias and foreign co-sectarians. In this instance, therefore, it can 
be said in fairness that the Islamic Republic has contributed to the framing of political mobilizations in 
‘sectarian’ idiom. Estimates as of June 2015 contend that close to 400 Iranian and Afghan fighters have 
been killed since 2011,109 and despite the death of several senior personnel in quick succession in October 
2015, the figure remains relatively modest in the overall scheme of things, even while official denials of 
Iranian involvement have long lost any semblance of credibility. The presence of Russian troops and aerial 
sorties striking at forces opposed to Assad, in other words, great power cover, has however, increased Iran’s 
willingness to employ Iranian members of the IRGC in ground campaigns. This, however, has and will in 
all likelihood remain relatively measured. Also given the demographic balance, there is no prospect of a 
mass mobilization along the lines of Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaʿbi, by means of which Iran could emplace allies 
within the flux of a larger socio-political movement. Thus to paraphrase Mao, though in times of weak 
central statehood and acute insecurity Iraq’s Twelver majority affords the Islamic Republic the ability to 
embed allies within a broader socio-political movement, like fish in the sea, while at the same time 
contending to support Iraq’s national defence and territorial integrity (the broad social base can however 
temper the extent of such influence); Syria provides no such opportunity, and therefore the Islamic Republic 
has vacillated between outright denial and the ‘sectarian’ explanation adduced above in order to justify the 
hard-headed pursuit of its strategic interests. 
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In this paper I have tried to provide a tentative explanation of the drivers of Iranian security policy and its 
support for armed socio-political organizations in Iraq and Syria and its contribution to the logics of 
sectarianization in the civil conflicts currently wracking those two countries. The nested and interlocking 
series of security dilemmas and their interplay at the system and meso-levels, which emerge in weak states 
in times of acute crisis, can engender the conditions for a convergence of shared interests between foreign 
and domestic actors, and the presence of political entrepreneurs and violence specialists willing to step into 
the fold, mobilize, represent and connect communities in the face of security threats and activate the 
them/us boundaries which shape the nature of conflict in turn.  
 
The Islamic Republic’s desire to protect and augment strategic depth in light of its dated conventional 
military, and the specific genealogy of its war-making capabilities forged during the Iran-Iraq War, in tandem 
with its allies’ own local practices of war-making and representation, has contributed to the logic of 
‘sectarianization’, and has further fragmented the illusion of a monopoly of violence in both Syria and Iraq. 
The nature of Iranian political and military engagement in these two countries, despite practical similarities, 
varies considerably and is indissociable from both the nature of the regimes in power, questions of 
demography and the historical trajectory, composition and social bases of the militias and their antagonists. 
Moreover, if we view such militias, especially in the Iraqi case, as forms of contentious politics, harbouring 
case-specific mobilizing structures, repertories and framing processes, which mediate between political 
opportunities, organization and action, it complicates over-simplistic notions of proxy war and the client-
patron dyad, which often cast a pall over extant analyses.110 We can consequently better grasp the extent 
and constraints placed on Iranian political and military engagement in these conflicts, as well as the strategic 
policies upon which they rest, and the political conjunctures at which so-called sectarian mobilizations wax 
and wane. 
 
Under the most precarious of circumstances confessional identity has come to represent plural communities 
in their totality, while domestic actors competing as guarantors of security, have established material and 
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organizational ties with an external power, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran, in ways which are 
unprecedented in the histories of either Iraq or Syria. While, as this chapter has tried to show these 
relationships and the paramilitary groups, which have proliferated in Syria and Iraq, do not reductively lie 
in primordial sectarian affinities, or the Islamic Republic’s exceptional, ontological compulsion to dominate 
the region, there is the ever-present danger of generating path dependencies whereby a deficit of security is 
transfigured into totalizing sectarian animosity, and perceptions of enmity displace relations of amity, and 
become increasingly difficult to challenge and overturn.111 If one wishes to eschew such an eventuality from 
becoming the norm, in both analyses and reality, it is necessary to understand the nature of regional level 
security dilemmas, in addition to those polarizing disparate communities and how they are interrelated, so 
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